



International Baccalaureate[®] Baccalauréat International Bachillerato Internacional

HISTORY ROUTE 2 HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL PAPER 1 – THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT 1945–79

Wednesday 14 November 2012 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.
- The maximum mark for this examination paper is [25 marks].

Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ...; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement.

SOURCE A Extract from a speech by Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, given at the United Nations General Assembly, 25 September 1979.

The separate deal between Egypt and Israel resolves nothing. It is a way of piling up, on a still greater scale, explosive material capable of producing a new conflict in the Middle East. Moreover, added to the tense political atmosphere in this and the neighbouring areas is the heavy smell of oil.

It is high time that all states represented in the United Nations realized how vast the tragedy of the Arab peoples of Palestine is. What is the worth of declarations in defence of human rights – whether for refugees or not – if before the eyes of the entire world the basic rights of an entire people driven from its land and deprived of a livelihood are ignored?

The Soviet policy with respect to the Middle East problem is one of principle. We are in favour of a comprehensive and just settlement, of the establishment of a durable peace in the Middle East, a region not far from our borders. The Soviet Union sides firmly with Arab peoples who resolutely reject deals at the expense of their legitimate interests.

SOURCE B Extract from **Palestine: Peace not Apartheid** by Jimmy Carter, 2007. Jimmy Carter was US president between 1976 and 1980 and a key figure in the negotiations at Camp David.

Anwar Sadat withstood the condemnation of his fellow Arabs, who imposed severe though ultimately unsuccessful diplomatic, economic, and trade sanctions against Egypt in an attempt to isolate and punish him. Until much later, long after I left public office, neither the Jordanians nor the PLO were willing to participate in subsequent peace talks with Israel. This confirmed the Israelis' fears that their nation's existence would again be threatened as soon as their enemies could build up enough strength to mount an attack.

For Menachem Begin, the peace treaty with Egypt was the significant act for Israel, while solemn promises regarding the West Bank and Palestinians would be ignored or deliberately violated. With the bilateral treaty, Israel removed Egypt's considerable strength from the military equation of the Middle East and thus it permitted itself renewed freedom to ... confiscate, settle and fortify the occupied territories.

[Extract from: Jimmy Carter (2007) Palestine: Peace not Apartheid, Simon and Schuster, New York.]

SOURCE C

Extract from the article 'From June 1967 to June 1997: Learning from our mistakes' by Clovis Maksoud, Arab Studies Quarterly, 1997. Clovis Maksoud is the former Ambassador of the League of Arab States to the United Nations and the United States.

In the 1980s, the Arab world was shocked by a series of traumatic developments that worsened the already existing complex conditions. Besides the 1978 visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem, which led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the fall of the Shah of Iran, and the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, there was a renewal of inter-Arab disputes and conflicts. With Egypt's suspension from the League of Arab States a vacuum was created which nearly paralyzed Arab cooperation, let alone Arab unity. The coincidence of Egypt's peace treaty with Israel and the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran had a decidedly deep impact on the Arab world in the eighties. The two developments tended to pull the region apart.


SOURCE D Extract from Waging Peace by Itamar Rabinovich, 2004. Itamar Rabinovich is the former Israeli ambassador to the United States 1993 to 1996.

The Camp David Accords turned Arab–Israeli diplomacy into a full-blown effort to achieve peace. By extending diplomatic recognition to Israel, signing a peace treaty with it, and establishing normal relations with it, Sadat and Egypt violated a taboo that an Arab consensus had strictly enforced for more than three decades. There were two parts to the Camp David Accords – an Israeli Egyptian agreement terminating the bilateral dispute between them, and a framework laying down the principles for resolving Israel's conflict over the Palestinians and its disputes with other Arab neighbours. But the two parts were not of equal importance. Begin and Sadat were primarily interested in their bilateral agreement, and both leaders saw to its strict implementation. Indeed, this was how the Arab world perceived the agreements: as Sadat's having betrayed them and made a separate peace with Israel. He was denounced and condemned, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, and most Arab states cut off diplomatic relations with Cairo.

[Itamar Rabinovich (2004) Waging Peace, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.]



Cartoon by Felix Mussil, a German cartoonist, on the Camp David Accords, March 1979.



Cartoon by Felix Mussil, a German cartoonist, on the Camp David Accords, March 1979.

| 1. | (a) | What, according to Source A, was Gromyko's reaction to Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement? | [3 marks] |
|----|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| | (b) | What is the message conveyed by Source E? | [2 marks] |
| 2. | | pare and contrast the views expressed in Sources C and D about Camp David and Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement. | [6 marks] |
| 3. | | reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and ce B for historians studying Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement. | [6 marks] |
| 4. | Egyp | g the sources and your own knowledge, analyse the significance of the ptian-Israeli Peace Agreement and events in the Middle East for Israel and the Arab d up to the end of 1979. | [8 marks] |

8812-5331